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Abstract
Only 17 out of 435 congressional races in 2004 were decided by 9 points or less.
Observers and scholars with perspectives as disparate as Thomas Friedman, Michael
McConnell, Samuel Issacharoff, and Lexington in the Economist have connected the
practice of incumbent protecting gerrymanders with these one-sided outcomes and a
resulting shrillness and ideological rigidity in our contemporary politics. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court continues to treat incumbency protection as a traditional and
acceptable redistricting principle. This article argues that the Court’s position is wrong
and that the Court should undertake to limit these kinds of gerrymanders. Part I of the
Article sets out three lines of attack on these gerrymanders as they apply to congressional
redistricting, arguing that they are inconsistent with the framers’ understanding of the
purpose of elections, that they have locked in an undemocratic practice in a manner
which makes them virtually immune to challenge, and that they deny non-aligned voters
fair and effective representation in violation of the equal protection clause. Part II then
seeks to make the case for judicial regulation of excessive incumbent protection
gerrymanders by showing, among other matters, that there is a manageable standard for
identifying such gerrymanders and a reasonable way to remedy them. In the course of the
article, I try to show how such regulation is consistent with our constitutional framework
and is necessitated by the Court’s own approach to the political process. I also address
possible objections to a suit challenging such gerrymanders on grounds of lack of
standing, the political question doctrine, and concerns for federalism.
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Help Wanted: The Constitutional Case against Gerrymandering
To Protect Congressional Incumbents
Walter M. Frank

Walt Whitman loved elections with their torchlight parades, unending campaign oratory
and passionate divisions. For him, « the most powerful scene in the western world »
was« the still small vibrating voice – America’s choosing day. »1
Had he been told that America’s real choosing days now occur long before the voters
go to the polls, he would undoubtedly have disapproved. But, at least with respect to the
House of Representatives, that is precisely the case. Today, most elections for Congress
have all the suspense of driver’s license renewal and all the excitement of a trip to the
mall.
In the 2004 congressional election only 17 out of 435 races (a ratio of approximately
one in twenty-five) were decided by nine points or less.2In Ohio and Florida, certainly
two of the most contested states in the presidential election, only two out of forty-three
congressional races were decided by less than twenty points.3 Outside of Texas where a
special and virtually unprecedented interim redistricting occurred aimed at eliminating
Democratic incumbents, only 3 incumbents were defeated in the general election.
The 2002 congressional election, the first election following the latest round of
redistricting, had similar results:
« Only four challengers knocked off incumbents in the
November 2002 general election – a modern record low not
only for a redistricting year, but for any election year. In
California, none of the 50 general-election challengers
garnered even 40% of the total vote.....On average, the 435
victorious candidates won a higher percentage of the

1

Walt Whitman, « Election Day, 1884 », In Walt Whitman, Complete Poems, Penguin Classics, 586 (2004
edition).
2
Compiled from information available in Wikipedia
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popular vote than in any House election in more than half a
century. »4
While incumbency brings with it many competitive advantages (including name
recognition, enhanced fundraising ability, and the opportunity to perform services for
grateful constituents), there is no question but that redistricting affords the parties a major
opportunity to protect incumbents, especially otherwise vulnerable incumbents. The
2000 redistricting in particular was marked by a largely successful effort by both parties
to protect their most vulnerable members.5
Many thoughtful commentators have lamented these developments. One leading
scholar generally viewed as a conservative has written:
« The problem has become particularly acute with modern
computer districting software which allows map-makers to
create imaginative districts with the precision of a surgeon.
The results? Protection for incumbents, a tendency toward
homogeneous-and hence more partisan districts, racial and
partisan gerrymandering, and, ultimately, a widespread
sense that elections do not matter. »6
Single member House districts are not constitutionally mandated. The requirement has
been imposed on the state legislatures by federal statute since 18427 pursuant to
Congress’s authority under Article I, Section 4, clause 1 of the Constitution.
In Gaffney v. Cummings8, decided in 1973, the Supreme Court upheld a districting
plan for the Connecticut state legislature, citing its political fairness to the two parties.
The plan, relying on an analysis of past election results, created safe seats for both parties
roughly in proportion to their voting strength in the State. « The reality is, » wrote Justice
White, « that districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political
consequences. »9In so holding, the Court implicitly accepted the principle of incumbent
protection.
And while Gaffney involved a plan for redistricting a state legislature, in White v.
Weiser,10 decided on the same day as Gaffney, the Court indicated that avoiding contests
4

Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives : What Went Wrong in the Latest Round of
Congressional Redistricting , 2 Election L.J. 179, 182 (2003).
5
Id. at 186: « Redistricting significantly strengthened ‘at risk’ incumbents. »
6
Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases : Original Mistakes and Current Consequences,24
Harv. J. Of L. And Pol. 103 at 103-104. See also Sally Dworak-Fisher, Drawing the Line on Incumbency
Protection, 2 Mich. J. Race and L. 131 at 135 (1996) : « Incumbents’ political ability to more accurately
manipulate the outcome of elections through database information, computer information, and computer
programs has exacerbated traditional unease with self-dealing and increased scrutiny of the redistricting
process. »
7
Act of June 25, 1842, s 2, 5 Stat. 491
8
412 U.S. 735 (1973).
9
Id. At 753.
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412 U.S. 783 (1973)
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between congressional incumbents might be a legitimate state interest sufficient to justify
deviations in the rigid standard of population equality for congressional districts.11
As for the current Court, in Vieth v. Jubelirer12, Justice Scalia, writing for himself,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor and Justice Thomas, called incumbent
protection « a traditional and constitutionally acceptable districting principle »13 and
Justice Souter, in a dissent joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote, « Gaffney is settled law,
and for today’s purposes, I would take as given its approval of bipartisan gerrymanders,
with their associated goal of incumbent protection. »14
The attitude of the Court toward incumbent gerrymandering is in direct contrast toward
its view respecting excessive partisan gerrymanders. Though the Court has found it
virtually impossible to agree on a manageable standard for regulating such gerrymanders,
it appears almost unanimous in regarding them as a constitutional violation.15
In a recent article, two noted scholars wrote, « The Justices, recent opinions almost
entirely ignore the question whether judicial intervention should be directed at
entrenchment itself, rather than the secondary question of who gets to be entrenched. »16
Such omission is unfortunate since excessive incumbent gerrymandering is both more
dangerous if uncorrected and more amenable to judicial regulation than partisan
gerrymandering.
The goal of this article is to advance these propositions specifically with respect to
redistricting for the House of Representatives.
I make two central arguments : (1) a state redistricting plan which results in an
overwhelming number of non-competitive districts should be held presumptively
unconstitutional as an excessive incumbent protection gerrymander and (2) the Court can
establish a manageable standard for identifying, and a workable remedy for correcting,
such gerrymandering.
In Part I of this article I argue that pervasive incumbent protection plans are
unconstitutional, in the context of Congressional redistricting, because (a) they destroy
the accountability that frequent elections were intended to achieve; (b) they are
inconsistent with fundamental democratic principles which the Supreme Court has held
to be of constitutional dimension; and (c) they constitute a denial of equal protection to
independent voters. While each claim stands separately, together they may be viewed as
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Id. at 298.
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Id. at 352.
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In Vieth v. Jubelirer, even the four justices who would have ended the project of fashioning a standard
for excessive partisan gerrymandering did not deny that it constituted a constitutional violation. (See
quotation from Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion cited at Note 57.)
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Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line? Judicial Review of Political
Gerrymanders, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541 at 543 (2004-2005).
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different perspectives on the same problem since each line of attack ultimately points to
the same remedy.
I argue in Part II that the Supreme Court should address the issue of pervasive
incumbent gerrymandering because (a) a principled and manageable standard for
handling such cases can be formulated; (b) potential objections to the judiciary’s entering
into this arena, primarily objections based on lack of standing, the political question
doctrine, and concerns for federalism, are answerable; (c) a workable remedy can be
fashioned that will not involve the judiciary in micro-managing politics around the
country; and (d) our constitutional structure and the logic of the Supreme Court’s own
decisions make it both necessary and appropriate for the Supreme Court to deal with this
question.
In Part II I propose as a manageable standard the concept of a mathematical formula
for non-competitiveness state-wide based on the number of districts which result in
victory margins in excess of a certain percentage. I argue that the creation of such a
formula is completely in line with current Supreme Court precedents. I look at the
potential objections to such a formula and also consider the wisdom of initially leaving to
the lower courts the creation of state specific standards of non-competitiveness. I also
propose that the remedy for a violation should be process driven, taking away from the
legislature any authority to redraw lines once a violation has been established. In effect, I
am suggesting as a remedy what Professor Issacharoff has proposed as a guiding
constitutional principle in the first instance, namely that self-interested actors should not
be drawing district lines.17 I would be willing to give the legislature one bite of the apple
but not two. I conclude Part II by pointing to a number of factors which I believe make
the Court’s regulation of the incumbent gerrymander both necessary and appropriate,
including that such regulation furthers a variety of interpretive approaches to
constitutional decision-making.
*
*
*
Incumbent protection gerrymandering is an important topic not only because it
involves the degrading of a fundamental right but also because it goes to the heart of what
kind of democracy we will enjoy. The result of so many « safe » districts, as one well
known observer has recently pointed out, is that « few candidates have to build crossparty coalitions around the middle ».18 Consequently, the system produces candidates
« who appeal only to their party’s base – so we end up with a Congress paralyzed
between the far left and the far right. »19 As noted, the Supreme Court in Gaffney
recognized that districting has substantial political consequences. As I hope to show in
this article, when one of those consequences is the virtual elimination of competitive
elections, we have an issue of constitutional dimension.
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See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 Harvard L. Rev. 593 (2002)
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Part I
A. A redistricting plan marked by a pervasive concern for incumbent protection is a
constitutional violation because it directly undermines the original constitutional intent
respecting the nature and purpose of House elections.
1. Elections and Accountability. Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, most
legislative representatives were elected for a one year term. In fact, the conventional
wisdom was « Where annual elections end, tyranny begins. »20 Madison believed that
frequent elections would inevitably assure a continual turnover of all but the ablest
representatives. 21
In No. 57 of the Federalist Papers, Madison argued that elections would assure
congressional accountability. There Madison addresses the charge that the House of
Representatives will inevitably « be taken from that class of representatives which will
have least sympathy with the mass of the people. » 22Answering this objection, he first
points to a number of factors making it unlikely that a representative would ignore the
mass of his constituents. But then Madison adds:
« All these securities would be found insufficient without
the restraint of frequent elections. Hence, in the fourth
place, the House of Representatives is so constituted as to
support in the members an habitual recollection of their
dependence on the people. Before the sentiments impressed
on their minds by the mode of their elevation can be
effaced by the exercise of power, they will be compelled to
anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when
their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must
descend from the level from which they were raised; there
forever to remain unless a faithful discharge of their trust
shall have established their title to a renewal of it. »23
(Emphasis added.)
When representatives choose their voters to perpetuate themselves in power, Madison’s
vision is compromised beyond recognition.

20

See The Federalist No. 53 (James Madision) (Benjamin F. Wright, ed., 1961, Harvard University Press,
1961) reprinted as Barnes and Noble Books edition p. 364 (2004).
21
Id. at 368.
22
The Federalist No. 57 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright, ed., 1961, Harvard University Press, 1961)
reprinted as Barnes and Noble Books edition p. 383 (2004).
23
Id. at 385
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2. Framers’ fear of manipulative power of legislators. The framers of the Constitution
genuinely feared that representatives could perpetuate themselves in office by changing
the rules of the game. Indeed, the Supreme Court cited that fear in U.S. Term Limits v.
Thornton24, to be discussed later, to show that individual states could not add to the
qualifications fixed in the Constitution for holding congressional office.25
Two statements made during the framers’ debate over the qualifications clause (both
were quoted by the Court in Thornton) illustrate this viewpoint. Hugh Williamson, a
delegate from North Carolina, expressed the fear that if Congress was composed of « any
particular description of men, of lawyers for example....future elections might be secured
to their own body. »26 In the same debate, Madison noted, « a Republic may be
converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy as well by limiting the number capable of
being elected, as the number authorized to elect. »27.
3. Elections and Legitimacy. Madison’s views expressed in the Federalist and the
debates at the Constitutional convention are not our only sources for the historical
understanding of elections. Professor Rebecca Brown, citing the work of Edmund
Morgan, has shown that colonial elections were viewed not as mechanisms for translating
the will of the majority into public policy but were really about accountability in the
sense of serving as the check, the primary and perhaps only check, on entrenched
power.28 « A virulent and prolonged debate, » she writes, « about the nature of
accountability in the government went on for years, before, during, and after the drafting
and ratification of the Constitution. »29 She continues:
« The view of those who ultimately prevailed in the debate
over accountability was expressed in 1787 by Benjamin
Rush : ‘It is often said that « the sovereign and all other
power is seated in the people.’ This idea is unhappily
expressed. It should be – ‘all power is derived from the
people.’ They possess it only on the days of their elections.
After this, it is the property of their rulers, nor can they
exercise it or resume it, unless it is abused. »30 (emphasis
added)
The highlighted language from Benjamin Rush’s statement is particularly telling
because it underscores the prevailing view at the time of the writing of the Constitution

24

514 U.S. 779 (1995)
Id. at 790-791.2
26
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p.250 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) quoted in U.S. Term Limits v.
Thornton, Supra, Note 19 at 791.
27
2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p.249-250 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) quoted in U.S. Term
Limits v. Thornton, Supra, Note 19 at 790-791.
28
Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty and the Constitution, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 531 (1998). See
discussion at 558 to 571.
29
Id. at 568.
30
Id. at 568.
25

8

that the « people » govern themselves only in the sense that they choose those who are to
govern them. The vehicle for that choosing is of course our electoral system.31
Thus, when incumbents are allowed to manipulate district lines to help assure their
own re-election, they are not just playing politics, they are sabotaging the sole source of
their authority to govern. It is certainly true that political parties were not within the
contemplation of the framers who indeed feared the factions which have in fact become,
through the two party system, the organizing principle of modern politics. But the fact is
that pervasive incumbent gerrymandering is not in furtherance of a two party system but
of a one-party, the Democratic-Republican, system. In any event, regardless of the
vehicle, fixing election outcomes in advance is hardly consistent with the notion of
elections as the legitimating source of legislative governance.
*

*

*

The power of incumbency in a society immeasurably more complex than Madison
could have ever imagined is a given. As previously noted, much of that power is
inevitable given the advantages of incumbency. But when the judiciary adds to these
advantages by giving a free pass to a redistricting motive so at odds with the intent of the
framers, it places politics on much too high a pedestal.
B. Gerrymandering for incumbent protection when carried to extremes is also a
constitutional violation because it offends basic democratic principles in a way that is not
amenable to change through the normal political processes. Elections are the normal
political proocess for effectuating changes in membership in the House of
Representatives but excessive incumbent gerrymanders are intended to damage the
efficacy of that process.
1. A dead-end street. Baker v. Carr32 established that legislative practices which seek to
freeze the status quo in ways which are beyond the ordinary power of the electorate to
reverse can be unconstitutional and are the judiciary’s business.
In his monumental work on the reapportionment revolution, Robert Dixon endorsed
Baker v. Carr and its progeny because « when political avenues for redressing political
problems become dead-end streets some judicial intervention in the politics of the people
may be essential in order to have any effective politics. »33
The growing effectiveness of incumbent friendly redistrictings over the past few
decades has come close to creating the same dead end street for competitive elections to
31

For an additional perspective which also emphasizes the key role of elections in the constitutional
structure, See Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory, 153 U. Rev. 459 at 476-477. Professor Ortiz concludes, “Nearly
every special feature of the House’s design was meant to ensure that it, unlike other primary structures of
the federal government, was highly responsive to public sentiment.” (at 477.)
32
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
33
Robert G. Dixon Jr., Democratic Representation – Reapportionment in Law and Politics, 8 (1968).
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the House. Theoretically, state legislatures (or redistricting commissions in the few states
which utilize them for congressional redistricting)34 can enact legislation making
competitiveness a redistricting value. Only Iowa, however, has gone so far as to require
that the legislatively created commission charged with the initial responsibility for
drawing a plan must ignore political data. Not coincidentally, « Iowa is the only state to
attempt to conduct redistricting via a politically neutral body. »35 In some states,
appointed commissions believe that a key part of their role is to protect incumbents in
order to protect the state’s influence in Congress.36
The defeat of the redistricting initiatives in Ohio and California in 2005 also
underscores how the political parties can mobilize to defeat redistricting efforts not
perceived to be in their best interest. As one article noted, « The problem with both the
California and Ohio Initiatives was not that voters don’t want reform, it’s that they
perceived these two initiatives as partisan power grabs. And the voters were largely
right. »37
Incumbent protection works with ever increasing effectiveness due to a combination of
factors: (1) the identification of many voters with one or the other of the two major
parties (2) the resulting predictability of voting patterns;38 and (3) the enormous power
that today’s computer technology affords legislators to harness that predictability to
create gerrymandered districts.
Districts packed with enough solid Democratic or Republican votes make it virtually
impossible for any challenger from the other party or an independent to succeed. When
the two parties come together for the purpose of manipulating election results in advance,
there is no real political check on that behavior.
Pervasive incumbent gerrymandering is actually more of a ‘dead-end street’ than
partisan gerrymandering because at least in partisan gerrymandering, the party
34

The States that use a commission for congressional redistricting are Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,
New Jersey and Washington with Indiana using one if the legislature cannot pass a plan. Arizona’s
commission was created through passage of a voter initiative. See Justice Breyer’s dissent in Vieth at 541
U.S. 267 at 363 (2004).
35
Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 837 at 848 (1997).
36
New Jersey provides one example. See Donald Scarini and Nomi Lowy, Congressional Redistricting in
New Jersey, 32 Seton Hall L. Rev. 821 at 832-835 (2003). For a broader treatment of the subject of
redistricting commissions, see Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 75 Tex. L.
Rev. 837 (1997). For an article giving a good ground level view of redistricting in one state, see Timothy P.
Brennan, Note, Cleaning out the Augean Stables : Pennsylvania Most Recent Redistricting and a Call to
Clean Up this Messy Process, 13 Widener L.J. 235 (2003).
37
Sam Hirsch and Thomas E. Mann, For Election Reform, a Heartening Defeat, the New York Times,
November 11, 2005, p. A23.
38
« In the November 2002 elections 86% of all successful House candidates belonged to the same party as
the presidential candidate who carried the District in November 2000 – a level of consistency unmatched
since the 1940’s. » Hirsch, supra Note 2 at p. 185. In the 2004 elections, the percentage was almost exactly
the same. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._presidential_election_2004. The information is contained
in Section 3.5.

10

controlling the redistricting process faces risks when it engages in extreme
gerrymandering. If it tries to spread its vote over too many districts, it decreases its
margin of error and creates less safe seats, something abhorrent to all incumbents
regardless of party. This is what Justice O’Connor meant when she argued that partisan
gerrymandering is essentially a « self-limiting enterprise. »39 No such check exists with
respect to incumbent gerrymandering. When there is a shared goal of maximizing
incumbent protection, the more lopsided the margins the more the gerrymandering goal
has been accomplished. To use the current terminology, partisan gerrymandering depends
upon a combination of « packing » and « cracking ». Incumbent protection is only about
packing.
The political impact of the Supreme Court’s willingness to tolerate pervasive
incumbent gerrymandering is heightened by the Court’s decision in U.S. Term Limits v.
Thornton.40 In this case, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state constitutional
amendment enacted by the voters of Arkansas with the admitted goal of eliminating
career legislators in the Congress (as well as the State legislature). The Arkansas
amendment, among other things, denied ballot access to congressional candidates who
had been elected to two terms to the United States Senate or three terms to the House.
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the amendment constituted an additional
qualification for office and that the Constitution did not allow states to impose additional
qualifications.
The effect of this decision was to invalidate the one direct avenue voters had to
overcome the long term effects of the incumbent protection gerrymander. As a measure
of the depth of feeling on this issue, it should be noted that following U.S. Term Limits v.
Thornton, the voters of Nebraska, South Dakota, Maine, California, Colorado, Idaho,
Arkansas and Oklahoma each passed initiatives (ultimately found unconstitutional in
each case by Circuit Courts of Appeal) intended to encourage the passage of a federal
constitutional amendment allowing for the establishment of congressional term limits.41
2. Inconsistency with Democratic values. Professor Sunstein has suggested that
deliberative democracy, that is democracy that sees real value in the meaningful
participation of the broad electorate, has two goals: « political accountability and reasongiving. »42 I would argue that incumbent protection gerrymanders deeply offend both
goals : certainly political accountability is diminished when political parties through
redistricting reconfigure constituencies for the purpose of assuring the re-election of their
own incumbents and reason-giving is also undermined since incumbents having no fear
of defeat have no real reason to explain themselves or their actions.
While perhaps not of direct constitutional relevance, I would also submit that it
violates democratic principles to treat individuals as nothing more than statistical
aggregates.
39

Davis v. Bandemer 478 U.S. 109, 152 (1986).
Supra, Note 24.
41
See Cook v. Gralike 531 U.S. 510, 518 note 10 (2001).
42
Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time – Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court, 31 (1999).
40
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In his dissent in Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly,43 Justice Stewart wrote:
« Legislators do not represent faceless numbers. They
represent people, or more accurately a majority of the
voters in their districts – people with identifiable needs and
interests which require legislative representation and which
can often be related to the geographic areas in which these
people live. »44
Voters are not faceless numbers and a districting plan that counts their votes before
they are cast renders their vote as meaningless as a process which fails to count them
afterwards.
3. A distortion of the purpose of geographic based districting. Pervasive incumbent
gerrymandering plans also diminish the constitutional validity underlying the whole
process of drawing geographic lines. When Congress first enacted the requirement of
single member districts, it did so because it recognized that in an at large election, many
interests in the State might not be represented.45 Districting was created not to minimize
competition but to assure that there were many competitions so that in effect one
competitive result would not prevail throughout the State. Balkanizing a State in such a
way as to eliminate competition was the farthest thing from Congress’s mind in 1842
when it introduced the requirement of single member districts.
The drawing of geographic lines should relate in significant part to geographic factors
that enhance the effectiveness of representation. So-called neutral factors which focus on
compactness, recognizing communities of interest, and keeping the entirety of a
municipality or county within the same congressional district, all arguably enhance the
goal of effective representation and thus are rationally related to the process of drawing
geographic lines. Incumbency gerrymanders (and partisan gerrymanders) on the other
hand merely seek to use geographic boundaries to accomplish a political purpose.
Commentators have made the point, correctly I believe, that no basis for drawing
geographic lines is completely neutral since even the choice of neutral criteria will almost
43

377 U.S. 713 (1964).
Id. At 750. Stewart argued unsuccessfully in Lucas that because geographic districting “carries with it
an acceptance of the idea of legislative representation of regional needs and interest” (at 750), Colorado
should be allowed to redistrict at least one of its legislative bodies on something other than the one man one
vote principle. The majority, in Lucas did not dispute that geographic districting to advance representation
based on regional needs was appropriate but made that goal of districting subject to the one man one vote
principle.
45
« The 1842 law was inspired in large part by complaints that statewide elections of congressional
candidates had resulted in a state’s single dominant political party winning all of that state’s congressional
seats, thereby impairing the ability of political parties in Congress to fulfill their role of representing a large
coalition of diverse interests. » Howard A. Scarrow, Vote Dilution, Party Dilution, and the Voting Rights
Act: The Search for Fair and Effective Representation, in Political Gerrymandering and the Courts,
Bernard Grofman, ed., p.45 (1990).
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inevitably assist one party more than the other.46 Moreover, it is naive to believe that
politics will not play some role in the districting process. It does not follow, however,
from either of these concessions that redistricting meets constitutional standards when it
degenerates into a wholesale effort to deny voters a meaningful choice in the general
election and to perpetuate those in power.
4. Practical effects as inconsistent with the healthy democracy and stable two party
systems which the Court ostensibly seeks to promote in its decisions governing the
political process.
The Supreme Court has endorsed a stable two party system as a good thing47 and a
legitimate objective of state legislation. 48
A stable two party system has been deemed worthy of constitutional protection by the
Court and commentators in part because the parties have been viewed as non-ideological
in nature.
In a dissent in a 1973 case joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall, Justice
Powell wrote:
« Political parties in this country traditionally have been
categorized by a fluidity and overlap of philosophy and
membership... »49
In 1981, in a dissent joined in by Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Powell wrote:

46

See Daniel H. Lowenstein and Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public
Interest : Elusive or Illusory, 33 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1, 35 (1985) where the authors after examining a number
of formal criteria, such as compactness, municipal boundaries and communities of interest conclude,
« From a practical standpoint, the most serious defect of the formal criteria is that, without justification,
they tend systematically to favor one of the two major parties.»
47
Justice O’Connor, for example, has written, « There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong
and stable two-party system in this country has contributed enormously to sound and effective government.
The preservation and health of our political institutions, state and federal, depends to no small extent on the
continued vitality of our two party system, which permits both stability and measured change. » Davis v.
Bandemer, Supra Note39 at p. 144-145.
48
Recent cases upholding such objective against claimed burdens on rights of independent voters and
independent and third party candidacies include : Burdick v. Takushi 504 U.S. 428 (1992) holding that
prohibition of write-in voting was not unconstitutional; Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party 520 U.S.
351 (1997) upholding anti-fusion legislation; California Democratic Party v. Jones 530 U.S. 567 (2000)
invalidating the blanket primary; and Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes 523 U.S. 666
(1998) upholding right of state-owned public television to exclude an independent candidate from a
televised debate. Earlier cases upholding state ballot access and registration requirements include Jenness v.
Fortson 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Rosario v. Rockefeller 410 U.S. 752 (1973); American Party of Texas v.
White 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown 415 U.S. 724 (1974); and Munro v. Socialist Workers Party
479 U.S. 189 (1986).
49
Rosario v. Rockefeller 410 U.S. 752, 769 (1973).
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« The Democratic Party is not organized around the
achievement of defined ideological goals. »50

In 1996, in a dissent joined in by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia as to
Parts I and III of the dissent, Justice Thomas wrote:
« American political parties, generally speaking, have numerous
members with a wide variety of interests, [citations omitted]
features necessary for success in majoritarian elections. »51
There is, I believe, a direct linkage between the Court’s belief in the essentially nonideological nature of American political parties and its promotion of a stable two party
system.
More and more, however, commentators have noticed the increasingly ideological
nature of our political parties and lay the blame in substantial part on the doorstep of
incumbency protection. I previously quoted a recent column by Thomas Friedman to this
effect.52 In a similar vein, Lexington in the Economist has written:
« ....The most striking thing about American politics is the
disjunction between the opinions of ordinary Americans
and the behavior of the political elites......A growing
proportion of Democrats come from deep-blue
congressional districts where it is more important to pander
to the liberal base than to reach across the aisles. And the
Republicans are doing everything they can to make the
middle ground uninhabitable......Revolt is growing,
particularly in the west against the institutionalized
gerrymandering that hands power to the political
extremes. »53 (emphasis added).
Scholars have come to the same conclusion. Thus Professors Karlan and Issacharoff
write, « The pervasive consequence of the incumbent gerrymander is that it skews the
distribution politically by driving the center out of elective office at the legislative
level. »54
Our two party system has produced effective governance because it has produced a
system in which people can broadly identify with the discernibly different principles and
50
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interests represented by the two parties but still be reasonably comfortable in turning to
either party when the party in power is no longer regarded as doing an effective job.
To the extent that the two party system no longer plays that role, the Court, given its
own underlying premise regarding the non-ideological nature of our political parties,
needs to be concerned.
One political scientist has noted, « When they [the major parties] are functioning
well, » they submerge racial, ethnic and religious differences « in a joint search for
communal victory. »55 Incumbent friendly gerrymanders negate this important role of
political parties because there is no need for ‘a joint search for communal victory’ in an
electoral landscape devoid of real competition.
Vigorous campaigns require that the parties engage each other and the voters. When
they don’t, a critical element in developing democratic consensus is lost and a political
atmosphere develops in which constructive debate and coalition building does not count
for much. Their absence in the electoral process inevitably carries over into the governing
process and may help explain the decline of both civility and consensus building in our
governing culture, particularly in the House of Representatives.
By making a stable two party system the basis of so many of its decisions56, the Court
has implicitly assumed responsibility for assuring that the system is working in a way that
promotes effective governance. That does not mean that the Court is somehow
responsible for controlling or even influencing political outcomes. Nor is it responsible
for how nicely people play in the sand box. But it does mean that, by entering the
political thicket, it bears some responsibility for assuring that the stable two party system
it promotes is not itself undermining our system of governance. When persons on all
points along the political spectrum see a direct connection between the absence of real
competition in our congressional elections and a growing disfunction in our governing
process, that is a matter which should concern the Court in the limited sphere in which it
does operate. And since incumbent protection is itself a result of a statutory scheme
mandated by Congress, regulation of such protection is well within that limited sphere.
5. A violation of democratic principles in and of itself can be unconstitutional without
reference to any particular provision of the document.
Even as conservative a justice as Justice Scalia has implicitly recognized that a
violation of democratic principles raises issues of constitutional import. Thus, in his
plurality opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer, he wrote:
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« Much of his [Justice Stevens’] dissent is addressed to the
incompatibility of severe partisan gerrymanders with
democratic principles. We do not disagree with that
judgment.....The issue we have discussed is not whether
severe partisan gerrymanders violate the Constitution, but
whether it is for the courts to say when a violation has
occurred, and to design a remedy. » (emphasis added). 57
Clearly Justice Scalia in this passage equates a violation of democratic principles with
a violation of the Constitution.
The one man one vote principle for congressional elections has been located by the
Court in Article I Section 2 of the Constitution,58 which provides for election to the
House of Representatives « by the people of the several States. ». A textual argument can
be made that incumbent gerrymandering violates this provision since incumbent
gerrymanders result in representatives who have effectively elected themselves. Even if
one views this as a strained interpretation, the absence of a particular textual reference
should not be decisive, for as Professor Issacharoff has noted, « There is no narrow
textual justification for almost any body of law governing the political process. »59
Moreover, since the single member district system for election to the House of
Representatives is imposed on the States by Congressional legislation, the absence of any
textual reference in the Constitution to how districting should be implemented should
carry little weight.
C. A state plan marked by pervasive incumbent redistricting is also unconstitutional
because it violates the right of the voter not affiliated with either major party to fair and
effective representation.
The constitutional violations described in A and B above harms all voters by
undermining the very purpose and democratic value of elections. (The possible standing
issue raised by this level of inclusiveness is discussed further in Part II below.)
In this Section C, I urge that independent voters are denied fair and effective
representation by pervasive incumbent protection gerrymandering. For purposes of this
argument, I define independents as those registered voters who do not affiliate with either
the Democratic or Republican parties since these voters are often accorded no role in the
nominating process for congressional candidates and are clearly identifiable.
The phrase, « fair and effective representation » comes, of course, from the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Reynolds v. Sims:
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« Since the achieving of fair and effective representation
for all citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative
apportionment, we conclude that the Equal Protection
Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal participation
by all voters in the election of state legislators. »60
As used in Reynolds v. Sims, fair and effective representation is supposed to be the
end product of the reapportionment process and, by extension, redistricting as well.
The question then becomes whether pervasive incumbent gerrymanders cause
independents to suffer an invidious discrimination which results in a denial of their right
to fair and effective representation.
Special status of independents as a political element.
Independent voters form a substantial portion of the electorate. Over the last 30 years,
approximately one-quarter to one-third of the population at any one time has
characterized itself as independent with one-third of this group indicating no preference
for either party and the remaining two-thirds indicating that they consider themselves
closer to one of the two major parties than the other.61
Independents by definition are uncomfortable with affiliating too closely with either
major party. Their reasons may be many ranging across a broad spectrum of attitudes
including fundamental disagreement with the principles of both parties, a belief that each
party embodies some good and some not so good principles, or a belief that neither party
has any principles at all. And, of course, the desire not to affiliate may have nothing to do
with principle. In fact, it may simply be a matter of personal temperament or a product of
family history or a dislike of the whole idea of political parties.
Whatever the reasons, independents in competitive contests are coveted by both parties
because, if they move clearly in one direction or another, they can determine the outcome
of an election.
Admittedly, suburban soccer moms or Roman Catholic blue collar workers are also
often targeted as a group by one party or the other and can swing election outcomes.
From a constitutional standpoint, however, independents (who certainly can include
soccer moms and blue collar Roman Catholics in their number), should be deemed to
enjoy a political status no different than Democrats or Republicans since such status is as
much a function of the registration process as the status of Democrats and Republicans
and a refusal to affiliate with either major party is as much a political statement as a
decision to affiliate. Thus, if Democrats and Republicans are entitled to be protected from
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extreme partisan gerrymanders, there is certainly no reason why independents should not
be protected from a gerrymander that works to eliminate their political influence.
Indeed, the consistent degradation of a « voter or a group of voters’ influence on the
political process as a whole »62 is precisely the injury independents suffer in the face of
excessive incumbent gerrymandering.
More than 30 years ago, the Supreme Court declared that apportionment schemes deny
equal protection when they « would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength
of racial or political elements of the voting population. » (Emphasis added)63 More
recently, the Supreme Court held that the major political parties are not required to allow
voters to vote in blanket primaries even when the voters of the State have, by initiative,
provided for that inclusion.64 When (a) independents are excluded by state law or internal
party policy from participating in the nominating process of the major parties and (b) the
major parties are constitutionally permitted to create a state delegation composed almost
exclusively of safe seats, it seems clear that the voting strength of a major political
element has been minimized if not cancelled out.
2. Hybrid nature of the Violation.
The equal protection claim I am advancing sounds in both individual and group rights.
Since the essential harm involves a denial of fair and effective representation based on
the deprivation of the right to cast a meaningful vote and the elimination of any practical
incentive to participate in the political process, the claim sounds strongly in individual
rights, just as Baker v. Carr sounded in individual rights even though, as a practical
matter, the case was ultimately about how rural interests had locked in their political
power at the expense of urban interests. Since independents, for the reasons discussed
above, are an important and clearly identifiable political element whose influence is all
but eliminated in non-competitive elections, it may be equally appropriate to view the
claim as resting in group harm as well. The hybrid nature of the claim is not a reflection
of weakness but rather the result of the fundamentally incoherent theoretical framework
laid down in the gerrymander cases which require that a group harm be examined through
the prism of individual rights.
3. Real injury.
Professors Pamela Karlan and Daryl Levinson have noted that the Supreme Court, in
gerrymandering cases, « has identified two reasons for finding no injury »65 :
« First, the ‘adequate representation’ theory holds that «
[a]n individual or group of individuals who votes for a
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losing candidate is usually deemed to be adequately
represented by the winning candidate and to have as much
opportunity to influence that candidate as other voters in
the district. » Second, the ‘virtual representation’ theory
takes as a premise that the relevant political unit for
determining the fairness of political influence is an entire
jurisdiction, rather than a single district. Thus, Democratic
voters in majority-Republican districts with Republican
representatives will have their distinctively Democratic
interests represented by Democratic representatives elected
from other districts. » [citations omitted]66
Neither the adequate representation theory nor the virtual representation theory
provides a basis for denying a claim based on pervasive incumbent gerrymandering. In
fact, the theory of virtual representation legitimizes looking at a pervasive incumbent
gerrymander from the perspective of the entire state. The concept also underscores the
way in which the independent voter is harmed by the pervasive incumbent gerrymander
because the independent has no virtual representation in the same way that Democrats or
Republicans do. With respect to « adequate representation’, it seems fanciful in the
extreme to believe that a group that is given no opportunity to influence the electoral
process in a meaningful way will still have as meaningful an opportunity to influence the
winning candidate’s views as other voters.
Let me briefly address three additional arguments against treating the incumbent
gerrymander as posing a serious constitutional harm to independents.
First, one might argue that independents can always register with a major party if they
wish to influence a nominating process. I would respond that to require a voter to register
as a Democrat or a Republican when, in fact, that voter does not actually view himself or
herself as a Democrat or Republican just so that they might have some influence on the
political process, would amount to a coercion of belief in violation of the First
Amendment and in any event does not answer the real difficulty of minimizing or
canceling out the voting strength of independents in the general election.
Second, To those who might argue that independents can form their own parties and
nominate their own candidates, I would point out that the two party system is so deeply
entrenched in our political system, in no small way the result of a myriad of Supreme
Court decisions, that such a right is simply not a realistic consolation for essentially being
frozen out of the current political process.
Finally, to those who might argue that even in highly one-sided districts, independent
voters are not prevented from exercising their political rights and their vote will still be
counted even though the result is a foregone conclusion, I would respond that the
individual worker in Lochner67 could theoretically negotiate his own terms and
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conditions of employment. Today, we recognize that the worker’s right was in fact
illusory and so too, I would argue, is the right of the independent, often undecided voter
to participate in an election whose outcome has already been decided.
.

Part II
In 1986, in Davis v. Bandemer68 the Supreme Court ruled that claims of extreme
partisan gerrymandering presented a justiciable issue. In 2003, in Vieth v. Jubelirer69,
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion stated that it was time to reverse that decision since the
seventeen years after Bandemer, to paraphrase a lengthy argument, had produced only a
lot of dead trees and billable hours, no manageable standard for discovering excessive
partisan gerrymandering having been found.70
I mention this at the outset of this Section because there may be a presumption that if
the Court can’t develop a manageable standard for partisan gerrymandering, it won’t be
able to develop one for incumbent gerrymandering either. There is, however, a crucial
distinction between the two claims. In partisan gerrymandering the concept of vote
dilution is critical since the claim is based upon unfairly dashed expectations of electoral
success and to prove that case one must show the results that the party was entitled to
expect but for the gerrymandered dilution of its vote. Vote dilution, however, is simply
not relevant to an incumbent gerrymandering claim. The basis of an independent’s equal
protection claim is being frozen out of meaningful participation in the political process
not the dashing of legitimate expectations of electoral success. Similarly, the violations
posited in Sections A and B of Part I are based on the fundamental incompatibility of
excessive incumbent gerrymanders with the role that elections play in our constitutional
and democratic processes.
1. A Manageable Standard
Not long after Bandier was decided, Professor Bernard Grofman, a political scientist,
suggested that the decision had created a clear and manageable standard for excessive
partisan gerrymandering, namely that it must be « (1) intentional, (2) severe, and (3)
predictably nontransient in its effects. » 71History has shown that Professor Grofman’s
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interpretation of Bandemer discounted language in the opinion that made it virtually
impossible for either major party to sustain an excessive partisan gerrymander claim.
I would suggest, however, that Professor Grofman’s reading of the Bandemer standard
is actually a manageable standard for an excessive incumbent protection gerrymandering
claim.
a. Intentionality.
Intentionality should not be a difficult element of the standard to meet.
In Bandemer, Justice White, in his plurality decision, wrote, « As long as redistricting
is done by a legislature, it should not be very difficult to prove that the likely political
consequences of the reapportionment were intended. »72
Moreover, intentionality can, consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach in other
cases,73, be inferred if the severity standard discussed below is met. As one scholar has
noted:
« Because public bodies do not confess invalid motives,
courts must often use inferential methods of proof; that is,
they must look at the effects. In many areas of the law,
there is a strong inference that the natural and probable
consequences of an action are intended. » 74
Intentionality should also not be a problem since legislators have very rarely made a
secret of their desire to protect themselves and their friends and, certainly in the
circumstance of shared power, incumbent protection is the one motive that unites all
legislators.
b. Severity.
A standard for severity can be quantified based on a definition of competitiveness. A
non-competitive district would be one in which the margin of victory was at least a
certain number of percentage points (we’ll call it the Victory Spread). One possible
standard would be that any plan in which at least x percentage (we’ll call it the
Gerrymandered District Percentage) of the total of the districts in the state were won by
the Victory Spread in the first election following redistricting would be presumptively
unconstitutional.
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Establishing a statistical standard for non-competitiveness is well within the
competence of the judiciary since it involves an objective inquiry into establishing that
margin of victory which creates a strong presumption of continued success for an
incumbent in the future.
Determining the Gerrymandered District Percentage is admittedly more of a
subjective, value-laden exercise. It is not, however, one the Court needs to shy away
from. Courts strike balances all the time. In this case, the balance is between
competitiveness as a value and incumbent protection. Establishing a minimum standard
of competitiveness is no more subjective an exercise than the Court’s development of
permitted deviations from the one man one vote principle for state legislative
redistricting.75
I accept as a given that it is very difficult, in analyzing the result of any one election
district, to show that redistricting, as opposed to other factors favoring a particular
incumbent, accounted for that incumbent’s success. But the basis of an incumbent
gerrymander claim must necessarily involve evaluating a state districting plan as a whole.
Incumbent gerrymandering becomes a particular constitutional problem not when one or
two favored leaders or rising politicians are afforded extra comfort in a particular district
but when the parties, taking advantage of their dominance of the political system, attempt
to protect all or virtually all their own with safe seats.
In short, while the motive of gerrymandering to protect incumbents, in the abstract,
violates the Constitution whenever it occurs, it becomes an affront to the constitution
requiring judicial intervention only when it is done wholesale, not retail, because it
ultimately was wholesale entrenchment which worried the framers and it is only now
when the practice has become so pervasive and so powerful that it presents a basic
affront to democratic principles and a denial, particularly with respect to independent
voters, of the right to fair and effective representation.
The development of a severity standard will not be without difficulties. Whether one
quantitative standard should govern the entire country or whether it should be individual
to a jurisdiction is, of course, something with which the courts will need to wrestle. It
may be appropriate also, as a standard develops, to exclude individual districts from
being counted toward the gerrymander under certain circumstances, for example, where
the number of registered Democrats and Republicans in a district are shown to be
registered in roughly equal numbers. Also, the total number of Democrats and
Republicans in the State may need to be taken into account in establishing the
Gerrymandered District Percentage.
There would also need to be a careful evaluation of the impact of a finding of
unconstitutionality on majority minority districts since they represent a normative value
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which should not be ignored in remedying an unconstitutional plan. In Mahan v. Howell,
the Court declared:
« ...it is open to the State, in the event it should fail to
achieve the goal of population equality to attempt to justify
its failure by demonstrating that precise equality could not
be achieved without jeopardizing some critical
governmental interest. »76
The presence of majority minority districts could similarly excuse, in proper
circumstances, what would otherwise be an unconstitutional plan under the severity
standard. Or, recalling the Court’s suggestion in White v. Weiser that congressional equal
population requirements might be relaxed to avoid clashes between incumbents, perhaps
some minor relaxation of strict population equality for congressional districts could be
allowed in the interests of a more competitive districting plan that would not significantly
affect majority minority districts.
From the standpoint of manageability, however, the key point is that defining the
parameters of a non-competitive district is a much less speculative and subjective inquiry
than the « what is fair » and « what might have been » benchmarks that have proved so
elusive for identifying excessive partisan gerrymandering.
The standard I have proposed is also inherently conservative. If the first election year
following a redistricting is one in which one party does exceedingly well, it is unlikely
that the incumbents of the disfavored party will consistently prevail to a degree meeting
the severity standard except in a highly gerrymandered plan. On the other hand, if such
election year results reflect normal election patterns, then a plan in which incumbents of
both parties consistently win by the Victory Spread presumably will reflect a
gerrymandered plan.
I say « presumably » because a prima facie case could perhaps be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence that the districting plan was drawn by a truly independent
commission or group which did not consider incumbent protection in developing its plan.
The proposed approach is, of course, not the only possible one. Its focus, for example,
on the election results immediately following the enactment of the plan might be seen as
too limited a time period for either finding or not finding a violation although I would
argue that the non-transience element of the proposed standard described below would
provide some comfort for the finding of a violation based on one election.
An alternative approach open to the Court would be simply to declare severe
incumbent gerrymanders unconstitutional without locking itself in too early to a
particular standard for non-competitiveness. We are in an area, after all, where the
political science community and even the legislature (once resigned to a new era in
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redistricting) can be very helpful in developing appropriate standards and in suggesting
ways to integrate competitiveness as a value in the redistricting process.
Just as Baker v. Carr established the justiciability of a claim rooted in
malapportionment without simultaneously establishing a standard, so might the Court
make clear that excessive incumbent gerrymanders are unconstitutional while leaving it
to the lower courts initially to develop the criteria for identifying such violations. In terms
of the framework proposed by Professor Sunstein for categorizing Supreme Court
opinions, it may be best to initially render an opinion which would be wide in the sense
of articulating a comprehensive constitutional norm but narrow in the sense that it would
initially be left to the lower courts to determine the breadth of situations to which the rule
would be applied.77
c. Non-transience.
Finally, as to non-transience, the third element of Professor Groffman’s standard, this
is a criteria in which the use of historical data would be appropriate. If prior election data
shows a history of one-sided election results on a level that would have raised a
presumption of pervasive incumbent gerrymandering had such gerrymandering been
previously a subject of judicial scrutiny, certainly such results would raise an inference
that the current gerrymander would be equally effective.78
2. Obstacles to Suit
a. Standing to Sue
Under Article III, Section 2, federal courts only have jurisdiction over a case or
controversy. One element of that requirement is that plaintiffs must establish that they
have standing to sue. In United States v. Hays79, the Supreme Court held that the
irreducible minimum for standing contains three elements: (1) injury in fact – defined as
an invasion of a legally protected interest which is concrete and particularized, not
conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal connection between the injury and conduct
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complained of; and (3) likelihood that the injury can be redressed by a favorable
decision.80
An independent voter claiming a denial of equal protection based on exclusion from
the political process should have no problem meeting the standing requirement since (a)
the right to fair and effective representation is a legally protected interest, (b) the inability
to cast an effective vote represents a real injury to that interest; (c) there is certainly a
causal connection between the gerrymander and the degradation of that voting right; and
(d) regulating incumbent gerrymandering to provide more competitiveness will afford a
fair if not complete remedy for the injury. (While the relevant jurisdiction for the
evaluation of the equal protection claim that I have proposed is the entire state, it is
possible that the Supreme Court might require the independent voter to reside in one of
the safe districts created by the Plan).81
The standing problem is more complex when we consider the violations posited in
Sections A and B of Part I. Concepts like concreteness and particularity obviously can
mean many different things depending upon the context. In the context of standing, some
guidance is afforded by Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reiteration in Raines v. Byrd that
« standing is built on a single basic idea – the idea of separation of powers. »82
With that basic understanding of the standing requirement in mind, it seems clear that a
voter’s claim that his vote has been degraded by a legislature’s attempt to pervasively fix
election outcomes is sufficiently concrete to meet a standing challenge. Indeed, the claim
itself shows why the concept of separation of powers should be given little weight, for the
very claim revolves around the allegation of an unconstitutional practice benefiting
members of the very branch of the government to whom separation of powers would
ordinarily require deference.
Moreover, the injury to the voter posed by incumbent gerrymandering is as great and
in fact more intimately connected to his or her status as a voter than the supposed injury
to the white voters allowed to pursue their claims of racial gerrymandering in the Shaw
line of cases.83 In these cases white voters in North Carolina were allowed to sue to
overturn majority minority districts. The claim that plaintiffs brought, as one scholar has
put it, was more about « feeling disenfranchised » than « being disenfranchised »84 and in
the final analysis was « not a claim about voting rights at all. »85 What was a stake was
the abstract proposition that gerrymanders should not be motivated primarily by racial
considerations. Whether one agrees with the Shaw line of cases or not, a claim that all
citizens are deprived of the right to participate meaningfully in the political process when
80
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incumbents seek to put themselves beyond the reach of the voters’ judgment is certainly
as real an injury as the claim of the white voters in Shaw v. Reno that they felt
disenfranchised. The fact is that Shaw imposed on the political process a requirement of
color blindedness based on no showing of real injury to the plaintiffs. In contrast, voters
suffer a real injury when all the significant choices have been made before they enter the
polling booth.
b. The Political Question Doctrine
In Baker v. Carr, the Court identified six concerns which could each justify invocation
of the political question doctrine.86 Among them, in addition to lack of manageable
standards discussed above, was «the impossibility of deciding [the question] without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion. » 87
Does a claim of excessive incumbent protection gerrymandering raise such a question?
Given the variety and importance of cases in which the Court has effectively made policy
determinations governing the political process, this concern, whatever applicability it
might have had half a century ago, should certainly not now bar consideration of an
incumbent gerrymandering claim.
As one scholar recently wrote:
« In the past decade alone, the Supreme Court repeatedly
has found itself in the center of major electoral questions. It
found the imposition of term limits on U.S. Senators and
House members unconstitutional, effectively nullifying the
most popular and widespread grassroots political reform in
decades. The Court has essentially outlawed political
patronage – the effect of which, many observers would
argue, has irreparably damaged partisan organizations’s
governing and campaign capabilities. At the same time, the
Court has upheld state laws that make it virtually
impossible for minor or new parties effectively to challenge
the two party status quo. It has considered the
constitutionality of racial, partisan and religious
redistricting and has barred ballot initiatives limiting civil
liberites. »88
It is difficult to see how the incumbent protection gerrymander raises any more of a
political question than any of the other redistricting cases cited in the above passage
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not to mention the cited cases dealing with the constitutionality of term limits and
political patronage. 89
Moreover, the political question formulation, like the standing requirement, is
rooted in a respect for the separation of powers.90 Separation of powers, however,
should not bar entertaining an incumbent gerrymandering claim because (a) the
Congress can hardly be expected to regulate a practice which so clearly benefits its
membership; (b) in any event we are dealing with the actions of state legislatures or
other state created bodies, not Congress; and (c) separation of powers is not a
particularly compelling concept when the legislature is in effect is acting as a
committee of the whole for the two party system rather than in its traditional
legislative capacity.
c. Federalism
Regulation of incumbent gerrymandering should not be avoided by the federal
judiciary out of concerns for federalism, at least in the case of districting for the House of
Representatives. The reasons are partly historic, partly structural, and partly peculiar to
the nature of the incumbency gerrymander claim itself.
The historic part deals with the framer’s intention respecting the House of
Representatives. The Senate was supposed to address the interests of the States, the
House the interests of the people. Madison makes this very clear in No. 39 of the
Federalist papers.91 Thus, the States, as political units, have no constitutionally based
interest in redistricting. This is important because one of the key defenses for incumbent
gerrymandering is that it increases the influence of the State in a body where power and
influence are based in substantial part on seniority. It should also be noted that (a) the
Senate, not the House, is the legislative body which the Supreme Court has held to be the
primary protector of state sovereignty92 and (b) any constitutional rule respecting
incumbent gerrymandering will be applicable to all the States and will not therefore put
any one of them at a disadvantage.
From a structural standpoint, deference out of a respect for state or local autonomy is
neither necessary nor appropriate when the issue is one of establishing appropriate
constitutional norms for election to a national office.
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Finally, deference is not appropriate in the circumstances of an incumbent gerrymander
for the same reason it was not appropriate in Kramer v. Union School District.93 That
case involved a challenge to a state law that provided that only certain school district
residents, those owning or renting property or with children enrolled in local public
schools, could vote in school district elections. In evaluating the equal protection claim
raised by an excluded person living in the District, the Court declared that in reviewing
statutes which deny some residents the right to vote, the general presumption of
constitutionality afforded state statutes was not applicable. The Court reasoned:
« The presumption of constitutionality and the approval
given ‘rational’ classifications in other types of enactments
are based on an assumption that the institutions of state
government are structured so as to represent fairly all the
people. However, when the challenge to the statute is in
effect a challenge to this basic assumption, the assumption
can no longer serve as the basis for presuming
constitutionality. »94
I would submit that the Court’s reasoning in Kramer is equally germane to an attack on
the constitutionality of a pervasive incumbent gerrymander since such an attack also
challenges the basic assumption of fairness which would otherwise entitle a state statute
to some deference.
3. The Remedy
Professor Daryl Levinson has argued that the distinction between rights and remedies
in constitutional law is a false dichotomy and that constitutional rights and remedies are
« inextricably intertwined».95 In the constitutional model he presents, constitutional rights
are « dependent on remedies not just for their application to the real world, but for their
scope, shape and very existence. »96
Professor Levinson’s insights strike a responsive chord in analyzing the issue of the
incumbent protection gerrymander. Does every attempt at protecting an incumbent
constitute a constitutional violation? That would arguably mean that every district in
which incumbent protection was the primary motive for drawing the district line would
need to be redrawn. If the constitutional violation only occurs when incumbent protection
becomes too pervasive a redistricting theme, then the remedy can be limited to
discouraging that practice.
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But there is a problem: How is a court to fashion a remedy that will make some
incumbents vulnerable but not others? Courts would seem to face the almost impossible
task of choosing which districts must be redrawn. As one article has noted, « The major
stumbling block for the weak anti-incumbent criterion, » which the authors define as a
criterion which would allow for some but not too much incumbent protection, « is how to
determine which incumbents should be sacrificed. »97
I would submit, however, that the judiciary need not make that determination in
fashioning its remedy.
Rather, since the violation is an abuse of a delegated power, then the remedy is to
deprive that body of the right to exercise that power for that particular redistricting cycle
by substituting a different process. As long as the plan is drawn by someone other than
the self-interested legislators themselves under standards that include competitiveness as
a constitutional value, then by definition the constitutional violation has to a considerable
extent already been remedied. 98
The process for districting in Iowa provides for a non-partisan commission to draft the
initial redistricting plan and specifically forbids the commission from considering
political data in formulating that plan.99 Adopting the Iowa process or some variant
thereof as a remedial tool for a districting plan that has gone too far in protecting
incumbents would not require any specific electoral outcome. It would redress the
unconstitutional balance created by that plan and would impose a penalty on the
legislature by effectively prohibiting any incumbent protection under the new plan to be
adopted.
A legislature operating in a constitutional environment in which incumbency
protection if carried to an extreme will result in the redistricting process being taken out
of its hands for that census cycle is likely to take steps to assure that such an outcome
does not occur.100 Once, therefore, legislatures get the message that competitiveness is a
constitutional value which must be recognized, our congressional elections are likely in
fact to meet their original goal of providing a measure of accountability and
responsiveness to public opinion. That would be the beneficial result of the proposed
remedy but the remedy itself would come simply from the substitution of a process in
accord with constitutional standards for a process which failed to meet those standards.
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Whatever remedial process is ultimately devised by the judiciary, and there doesn’t
necessarily need to be one size fits all, the process should be an open one with hearings
and input from the public and from legislative representatives. That the legislature might
have lost its chance to be the ultimate decision-making authority in the redistricting
process by reason of its gerrymander does not mean that it should not have the
opportunity to make its views known to the new decision-maker, whether it be an
independent commission, a special master appointed by the Court, or some form of
arbitration panel.
Whether or not the revised plan will actually result in more competitive elections is not
a judgment that the judiciary needs to make. Rather, judicial oversight of the remedial
process can and should be confined to the question whether in creating the revised plan,
the decision-maker did not consider incumbent protection as a primary factor in drawing
district lines and did make some effort to include competitiveness as a value in the
process.
One scholar opposed to an active judicial role in the regulation of gerrymandering has
written: « When the Court considers whether and how to regulate politics, it should resist
reforms requiring blunt remedial tools that threaten to transform, rather than refine, the
American political system. »101
While the caution is a good one, the fact is that incumbent gerrymandering and the
growing sophistication and power with which it has been applied, has itself worked a
transformation in our political system. Not only has it completely warped the reality of
electoral politics but, as previously discussed, it has arguably contributed in a significant
way to the polarization of our two major political parties into warring ideological camps.
The proposed corrective remedy is, in any event, not blunt but it is meant to restore
some sense of balance to the process by which redistricting lines are drawn. It does not
require a particular result and it can only be imposed when a plan falls short of meeting a
clearly discernable measure of competitiveness and there is no reasonable explanation
offered to explain the failure to meet that standard. Moreover, the local federal district
court judges, much more knowledgeable about the political culture of their State than the
Supreme Court, should have wide latitude to fashion a process that fits within that culture
and to judge whether the basic requirement that some effort have been made to consider
competitiveness as a value has been met. Whether or not increased competitiveness
results from such a plan will ultimately be up to the voters but at least they will know that
their vote did not occur in a Potemkin Village created by their government to foster the
illusion but deny the reality of a meaningful election.
.
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4. A Few Other Considerations
There are three other considerations deserving brief mention which support judicial
regulation of pervasive incumbent gerrymanders.: First, regulation is consistent with the
reasoning of most of the major approaches to constitutional adjudication; Second,
judicial involvement would not jeopardize the standing of the Court given the widespread
public concern over the entrenched power of incumbency; Third, incumbent protection is
inconsistent with the Court’s view respecting incumbency set forth in its major decision
dealing with political patronage.
a. Consistency with prevailing approaches to constitutional interpretation.
Pervasive incumbent gerrymanders should distress those embracing a variety of
interpretive theories and approaches to constitutional adjudication.
For the originalist, a practice which so clearly sabotages the framers’ intent respecting
responsiveness and accountability of elections should be of great concern. And there is
nothing in orginalism that requires the Court from forbearing to address this problem.
Professor Whittington has written:
« . The judiciary is not a problem to be worked into
American constitutionalism but an integral component of
that enterprise, and it is positively authorized to take action
under it. In that context, judicial passivism is appropriate at
the limits of interpretive knowledge but is distinctly
inappropriate when the constitutional law is available to be
interpreted and applied. »102
For those particularly mindful of constitutional law as a form of common law, the
incredible growth in the computing power of today’s technology and the amount of
information to which that technology can be applied means that incumbent protection
gerrymanders today are much more effective in fixing election outcomes than they were
even 30 or 40 years ago. Thus, a practice which might not have seemed as threatening in
the past can legitimately be seen as a much different, more potent problem today.
Regulation of pervasive incumbent gerrymandering also furthers the goal of
representation reinforcement and participation set out in famous Footnote 4 of the
Carolene Products case103 and in Professor Ely’s work104 because, as previously
discussed, pervasive incumbent gerrymanders essentially lock into our governance an
anti-democratic practice not easily remedied by normal political processes.
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Finally, those who regard themselves as majoritarians should be particularly distrustful
of a redistricting motive which allows legislators to handpick their own majorities and
entrench themselves in power. Majoritarians should also be especially concerned about
incumbent gerrymandering in light of U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton which, as previously
discussed, prohibits majorities from imposing term limits on their congressional
representatives.
I would submit that the appeal for regulating incumbent gerrymandering is heightened
by the fact that it can be seen as furthering a variety of interpretive approaches.
b. Acceptance.
Clearly, the judiciary should be wary of undertaking a role which risks its institutional
legitimacy. Obviously, this is a risk that the Court has been willing to undertake from
time to time.105 More to the point, however, judicial concern regarding incumbent
protection would only mirror widespread public concern over the same subject and thus,
if done appropriately, would likely enhance, not diminish the stature of the Court.
c. Elrod v. Burns.
Pervasive incumbent protection gerrymanders are also inconsistent with part of the
Court’s rationale in Elrod v. Burns. 106In that case, the Court prohibited political
patronage for employees other than policymakers in part on the ground that « Patronage
tips the electoral process in favor of the incumbent party, and where the practice’s scope
is substantial relative to the size of the electorate, the impact on the process can be
significant. »107 Certainly, if political patronage raises constitutional concerns because it
tips the electoral process in favor of incumbency, so should incumbent gerrymandering, a
much more direct means to the same end.

Conclusion
In Part I of this article, I proposed three separate foundations upon which a
constitutional claim against pervasive incumbent gerrymandering might be laid consistent
with current Supreme Court precedents. I then attempted to show why the Supreme Court
can and should declare such gerrymanders unconstitutional and, in the process, have
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offered some tentative suggestions respecting the specifics of a possible standard and
remedy.
The claim that I have described recognizes that some degree of incumbent
gerrymandering is inevitable and locates the constitutional violation in a scheme in which
incumbent protection is so extreme, on a statewide basis, that competitiveness,
accountability and the robust interaction our democracy contemplates have been
effectively eliminated. The actual harms created by these results include denying
independent voters the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the political system,
undermining the very reason we have elections, and the disintegration of a stable and
effective two party system into a jigsaw puzzle of one-party systems in which
nominations in effect substitute for elections.
Someone once drew the distinction between a genuine conversation and an apparent
conversation which is really nothing more than a series of intersecting monologues. Our
politics today have become a series of intersecting monologues. We need to restore the
conversation. Recognizing competitiveness as a constitutional value that needs to be
balanced against incumbent protection would be a step in that direction.
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